Risk Assessment

Forensic case formulation (pp. 81–106). John Wiley and Sons

Abstract: Formulation of violence risk has been a neglected topic in forensic mental health. This neglect may have been due to the proliferation of actuarial risk assessment procedures in the 1990s and 2000s, procedures that (as we will discuss) do not provide a basis for thinking sensibly about formulation. Thankfully, it appears the field is shifting away from numbers-based actuarial thinking about violence risk and toward evidenced-based clinical thinking—or, as Hart (2008) put it, from formula to formulation. Our goal in writing this chapter is to help stimulate discussion and improve practice with respect to the formulation of violence risk. The first part of the chapter discusses the practice of violence risk assessment. We define evidence-based risk violence assessment and describe two major approaches, focusing on a group of discretionary procedures known collectively as structured professional judgment (SPJ) guidelines. In the second part, we discuss formulation in (forensic) mental health and then review approaches to formulation of violence risk, including the SPJ approach. The third and final part presents a case study that illustrates formulation of violence risk using SPJ guidelines.

International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 13(2), 93–108

Abstract: The HCR-20 Version 3 (HCR-20V3) was published in 2013, after several years of development and revision work. It replaces Version 2, published in 1997, on which there have been more than 200 disseminations based on more than 33,000 cases across 25 countries. This article explains (1) why a revision was necessary, (2) the steps we took in the revision process, (3) key changes between Version 2 and Version 3, and (4) an overview of HCR-20V3's risk factors and administration steps. Recommendations for evaluating Version 3 are provided.

Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(2), 63–87

Abstract: The challenge of counterterrorism focuses increasingly on prevention. In this effort, nations are starkly confronted with questions about which people are likely to engage in terrorist action. Though a variety of risk assessment technologies are available for a range of populations and types of violent behavior, a robust empirical foundation does not yet exist for understanding the risk of terrorism or involvement in violent extremist activity. A structured assessment process that is systematic, transparent, and reliant on current evidence would serve the interests of both procedural fairness and substantive security, but a simple process of tallying risk factors is unlikely to be effective. This study outlines some of the foundational concepts and challenges for developing approaches to assess individuals' risk of terrorism involvement and violent extremist activity. It begins by examining the concept of risk assessment as it pertains to involvement in terrorism. Next, it suggests a series of guiding principles for developing a risk assessment approach. Finally, it outlines what a formulation-based risk assessment model for terrorist involvement might look like, at least conceptually.

International Journal of Developmental Science, 12(1-2), 129–141

Abstract: Violent extremism research is still lacking a sound empirical basis for the validation of assessment instruments. Yet there is a growing need for these instruments to assess the dangerousness of individuals, but also the success of interventions. By analysing prisoner files of one female and 39 male inmates (average age 28.83 years, SD = 7.58) with administratively assigned Islamism-related security labels in Bavarian prisons, we tried to clarify two questions: Firstly, is it possible to collect relevant data from prisoner files drawing on risk assessment procedures?
Secondly, how do inmates associated with the Salafist scene (security label “Salafist scene”) differ from those who are apparently involved with terror networks (security label “terror”), and do these differences predict the risk they pose? Our results suggest that files are a valuable, though not perfect data source for individual assessment and research. The two groups defined by the labels differ significantly in their biographies, mental health, and behaviour. Conclusions pertaining to biographical background factors, risk assessment, and management are discussed.

Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 37(5), 522–539

Abstract: This validation study analyses data from a sample of North American terrorist attackers (n = 33) and non-attackers (n = 23) through the lens of the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18; Meloy, 2017) utilizing a multivariate statistical approach – multidimensional scaling – to visualize potential clustering (co-occurrence) of risk factors. Rarely done in terrorism research, the results plotted in two-dimensional space show the clustering and co-occurrence of most of the eight proximal warning behaviors among the attackers, but not among the non-attackers, and less of a clustering and association of distal characteristics, but their presence in both attackers and non-attackers. These findings provide further empirical support for the rational-theoretical model of the TRAP-18, a structured professional judgment instrument for threat assessment of lone actor terrorists. It advances the quantitative analysis of operationally relevant and behaviorally observable indicators for use by law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals and their consultants. Findings are discussed in relation to other research on pre-offense behaviors of lone actor terrorists, and recommendations are made for both operational use and further research.

Journal of Forensic Sciences, 65(3): 865-881

Abstract: Improvements have been made in identifying the prevalence of risk factors/indicators for violent extremism. A consistent problem is the lack of base rates. How to develop base rates is of equal concern. This study has two aims: (i) compare two methods for developing base rates; the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) and direct questioning, (ii) generate base rates in a general population sample and compare these to a sample of lone-actor terrorists (n = 125). We surveyed 2108 subjects from the general population. Participants were recruited from an online access panel and randomly assigned to one of three conditions; direct survey, control, or UCT. Survey items were based on a lone actor terrorist codebook developed from the wider literature. Direct questioning was more suitable under our study conditions where UCT resulted in deflation effects. Comparing the base rates identified a number of significant differences: (i) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated
propensity indicators related to a cognitive susceptibility, and a crime- and/or violence-supportive morality more often; the general sample demonstrated protective factors more often, (ii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated situational indicators related to a crime- and/or violence-supportive
morality more often, whereas the general sample experienced situational stressors more often, (iii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated indicators related to exposure to extremism more often. Results suggest there are measurable differences in the prevalence of risk factors between lone-actor terrorists and the general population. However, no single factor “predicts” violent extremism. This bears implications for our understanding of the interrelation of risk and protective factors, and for the risk assessment of violent extremism.