Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Crime, Law and Social Change, 55(4), 277–285

Abstract: People engage in terrorism and similar forms of violent extremism for a variety of reasons, political or non-political. The frequent failure to achieve what they expected or dreamed about is also usually the source of their disillusionment, and subsequently, a main reason to disengage from violent extremism. Individuals involved in terrorism often come from a diversity of social backgrounds und have undergone rather different processes of violent radicalisation. Profiles of terrorists do not work as a tool to identify actual or potential terrorists because such profiles fail to capture the diversity and how people change when they become involved in militant extremism. This study suggests a more dynamic typology of participants in militant groups, based on dimensions which represent dynamic continuums rather than static positions. During their extremist careers individuals may move from resembling one type initially into acquiring more of the characteristics of other types at later stages. When it comes to prevention and intervention measures, one size does not fit them all. The typology may be used as an aid to develop more specific and targeted strategies for preventing violent radicalisation and facilitating disengagement, taking into account the diversity and specific drivers behind different types of activists.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies

Abstract: Based on an in-depth literature review, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' and the discourses surrounding them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, 'radicalism' – contrary to 'extremism' – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of 'vulnerable individuals' but also on the meso-level of the 'radical milieu' and the macro-level of 'radicalising public opinion and political parties'. The author re-conceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague is an independent knowledge centre that focuses on information creation, collation and dissemination pertaining to the preventative and international legal aspects of counter-terrorism. The core of ICCT's work centres on such themes as de-and counter-radicalisation, human rights, impunity, the rule of law and communication in relation to counter-terrorism. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT – The Hague endeavours to connect academics, policymakers and practitioners by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical research, exchange of expertise and analysis of relevant scholarly findings. By connecting the knowledge of experts to the issues that policymakers are confronted with, ICCT – The Hague contributes to the strengthening of both research and policy. Consequently, avenues to new and innovative solutions are identified, which will reinforce both human rights and security.

Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:3, 415-433

Abstract: This article conceptualizes political radicalization as a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence. Across individuals, groups, and mass publics, twelve mechanisms of radicalization are distinguished. For ten of these mechanisms, radicalization occurs in a context of group identification and reaction to perceived threat to the ingroup. The variety and strength of reactive mechanisms point to the need to understand radicalization - including the extremes of terrorism - as emerging more from the dynamics of intergroup conflict than from the vicissitudes of individual psychology.

Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(2), 425–435

Abstract: This article analyses the sociodemographic network characteristics and antecedent behaviours of 119 lone-actor terrorists. This marks a departure from existing analyses by largely focusing upon behavioural aspects of each offender. This article also examines whether lone-actor terrorists differ based on their ideologies or network connectivity. The analysis leads to seven conclusions. There was no uniform profile identified. In the time leading up to most lone-actor terrorist events, other people generally knew about the offender's grievance, extremist ideology, views, and/or intent to engage in violence. A wide range of activities and experiences preceded lone actors' plots or events. Many but not all lone-actor terrorists were socially isolated. Lone-actor terrorists regularly engaged in a detectable and observable range of activities with a wider pressure group, social movement, or terrorist organization. Lone-actor terrorist events were rarely sudden and impulsive. There were distinguishable behavioural differences between subgroups. The implications for policy conclude this article.

American Psychologist, 72(3), 205–216

Abstract: This article reviews some of the milestones of thinking about political radicalization, as scholars and security officials struggled after 9/11 to discern the precursors of terrorist violence. Recent criticism of the concept of radicalization has been recognized, leading to a 2-pyramids model that responds to the criticism by separating radicalization of opinion from radicalization of action. Security and research implications of the 2-pyramids model are briefly described, ending with a call for more attention to emotional experience in understanding both radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action.

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 33(3), 273–291

Abstract: Although the empirical and analytical study of terrorism has grown dramatically in the past decade and a half to incorporate more sophisticated statistical and econometric methods, data validity is still an open, first-order question. Specifically, methods for treating missing data often rely on strong, untestable, and often implicit assumptions about the nature of the missing values. We draw on Manski’s idea of no-assumption bounds to demonstrate the vulnerability of empirical results to different tactics for treating missing cases. Using a recently available open-source database on political extremists who radicalized in the United States, we show how point estimates of basic conditional probabilities can vary dramatically depending on the amount of missing data in certain variables and the methods used to address this issue. We conclude by advocating for researchers to be transparent when building analytical models about the assumptions they are making about the nature of the data and their implications for the analysis and its interpretation.

Journal of Forensic Sciences, 63(4), 1191–1200

Abstract: This article provides an in-depth assessment of lone actor terrorists’ attack planning and preparation. A codebook of 198 variables related to different aspects of pre-attack behavior is applied to a sample of 55 lone actor terrorists. Data were drawn from open-source materials and complemented where possible with primary sources. Most lone actors are not highly lethal or surreptitious attackers. They are generally poor at maintaining operational security, leak their motivations and capabilities in numerous ways, and generally do so months and even years before an attack. Moreover, the “loneness” thought to define this type of terrorism is generally absent; most lone actors uphold social ties that are crucial to their adoption and maintenance of the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. The results offer concrete input for those working to detect and prevent this form of terrorism and argue for a re-evaluation of the “lone actor” concept.

Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 11:2, 113-133

Abstract: This article explores the link between radicalization patterns and modes of attack planning and preparation among lone-actor terrorists. Building on theorized patterns of lone-actor radicalization, we discuss and compare their modes of pre-attack behaviour, including target and weapon choice, observance of operational security measures, likeliness of engaging in leakage behaviour, and the overall amount of time devoted to these activities. This exploratory study builds upon a dataset of thirty-three lone-actor terrorist cases in North-America and Europe between 1986 and 2015. The analysis suggests that specific patterns of radicalization are linked to systematic differences in modes of attack planning and preparation. The results provide insights into the heterogeneity of terrorist involvement and tentatively suggest the potential importance for law-enforcement agencies in using case-specific knowledge on radicalization patterns to inform forecasts of likely pre-attack behaviours.

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 43(2), 145–160

Abstract: Terrorists from a wide array of ideological influences and organizational structures consider security and risk on a continuous and rational basis. The rationality of terrorism has been long noted of course but studies tended to focus on organizational reasoning behind the strategic turn toward violence. A more recent shift within the literature has examined rational behaviors that underpin the actual tactical commission of a terrorist offense. This article is interested in answering the following questions: What does the cost–benefit decision look like on a single operation? What does the planning process look like? How do terrorists choose between discrete targets? What emotions are felt during the planning and operational phases? What environmental cues are utilized in the decision-making process? Fortunately, much insight is available from the wider criminological literature where studies often provide offender-oriented accounts of the crime commission process. We hypothesize similar factors take place in terrorist decision making and search for evidence within a body of terrorist autobiographies.

Perspectives On Terrorism, 15,(2), 77-99

Abstract: The European Database of Terrorist offenders (EDT) is based on comprehensive judicial information of convicted or deceased terrorist offenders, including social, psychological and psychiatric reports. This new empirical database is the result of a European cross-border collaboration between judicial organizations and scientists within the European Union. The EDT dataset comprises developmental, individual, biographical and contextual factors, which are potentially related to engagement in violent extremism and terrorism. It supports research seeking to identify critical risk and protective factors for violent extremism and terrorism. The EDT dataset could be used to conduct studies aimed at the identification of significant personal and contextual risk and protective factors for terrorism and violent extremism, improving and validating risk assessments, as well as identifying pathways into terrorism and radicalization. Moreover, this data can assist in the design of effective policy, prevention and intervention practices regarding potential violent extremist and terrorist offenders in Europe and elsewhere. The aim of this article is twofold: firstly, it seeks to present the EDT, along with discussing its development and methodology. To this end, the inclusion criteria and coding principles are discussed, alongside quality-, privacy- and security issues associated with the gathering and processing of judicial data, together with some preliminary statistics. Secondly, it aims to discuss potentials for research based on EDT data. Accordingly, potential applications and future developments of the EDT are discussed as well as urgent needs to use and further develop this comprehensive and unique database.